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Abstract
This article investigates how rape laws and rape cases are culturally influenced, with a 
focus on marital rape. The first part of the article looks at cultural influences on rape 
laws and compares the historical development of these laws in Danish legislation, 
Pakistani legislation and more broadly in Muslim law. Danish comparative law often 
compares with legislation in neighboring countries, but comparing to a more different 
legal system is valuable too. We find that in both Denmark and Pakistan, socio-
economic changes challenge existing definitions of rape and marital rape, leading to 
demands for legal reform, while the legal system tries to maintain as much continuity 
in the legal definitions as possible. In both jurisdictions, societal views on women and 
sex also influence how judges and jurors interpret the law, sometimes leading them 
to contradict the written law. The second part of the article analyzes two court cases 
involving marital rape in Danish-Pakistani couples. Cultural considerations influenced 
every part of these court cases, from the questioning of witnesses to the judges’ legal 
reasoning. Thus, having an understanding of the parties’ culture is important for judges 
and lawyers. The cases show that culture varies markedly between people from the same 
national background. Because culture is not uniform, parties are likely to disagree on 
which cultural rules they followed in their marriage. Judges must be aware that parties 
may rely on stereotypical cultural views to portray the other party negatively. The article 
concludes with recommendations, including the need to educate the population as legal 
concepts of rape change, as well as for judges to be aware of not only the legal culture 
and the culture of the parties, but also of how their own culture might influence their 
decisions. The article also reflects on recent legislative changes in Denmark and Pakistan 
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and points out that the debate in Denmark has not considered how consent and threats 
can have different implications in minority cultures.
Introduction
This article is inspired by two recent Danish court cases, which both had the same 
theme: a woman accusing her former husband of raping her during their marriage. In 
both cases, the couple had an ethnic and cultural background from Pakistan but lived in 
Denmark. 
The Danish judges had to deal with a combination of two difficult elements: 1) Rape, 
which is a notoriously difficult crime to prosecute, especially when it happens within a 
marriage, where the involved parties are assumed to normally participate in consensual 
sex. 2) Cultural differences, which influence concepts of marriage, gender roles and 
sexual expectations. Culture also influences the concept and regulation of rape, which is 
even today debated and undergoing change in Danish culture and law, as we will show. 
These two elements became a motivation for us to investigate how rape laws and rape 
cases are culturally influenced. The article is divided into two parts. 
In part one, we focus on the cultural influences on rape laws. We focus on marital rape, 
but also include regulation of adultery, fornication and rape outside of marriage, since 
the societal views on these concepts are linked with the view on marital rape. This part 
is a comparative study of the historical development of these laws in Danish, Pakistani 
and Muslim law. We wanted to see which insights could be gained about developments 
in these legal systems when comparing them with each other. We chose these legal 
systems based on the Danish-Pakistani element in the court cases. First, we provide a 
framework on how regulations differ based on societal views on gender and sexuality. 
We then investigate how these varying views have shown themselves in legislation across 
time. We look at the historical Danish regulation and on current debates in Denmark 
and compare with developments in Pakistan, although for the developments before 
Pakistan’s independence, we look more broadly at Muslim law. We have chosen the term 
Muslim law instead of e.g. Islamic law to better highlight that laws among Muslims are 
not only influenced by Islam but also by various other cultural and historical influences 
and therefore differ widely among Muslims. We find that our comparison of the legal 
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systems offers valuable insights on similarities and differences in development and on 
how culture and socio-economic factors influence rape legislation. 
In part two, we focus on other cultural influences than legislation on rape cases in 
Denmark. Here we analyze which role culture had in the two court cases on marital 
rape, e.g. in arguments of parties, lawyers and judges. 
By combining the two parts and using the Danish-Pakistani angle as an example, this 
article will lead to recommendations and inspirations for judges, lawyers, legislators 
and other professional actors on what to be aware of in cases concerning elements of 
sexuality and culture, e.g. cases involving minority cultures. These recommendations 
include awareness of both the legal culture, the personal culture of the judge and the 
culture of the parties. The article will also show the importance of raising awareness in 
the population, both for majorities and minorities, about rape laws and sexuality. 
Part 1: Cultural influences on rape legislation
Framework for analysis 
Which actions should be categorized as rape? This question has been given different 
answers across various cultures and various historical times. The answer depends on how 
the society views sex, sexuality and gender roles (Graversen, 1990; Rosen, 2006). These 
disagreements especially show themselves in the question of whether rape should be 
illegal inside a marriage – and to which extent. 
To help our analysis, we have decided on four main categories to describe the societal 
views that we have identified in the history of legislations. In the rest of the article, 
we will relate various legislations within Danish and Muslim/Pakistani legal history to 
these categories, and thereby provide further details of the exact way these views show 
themselves in reality. We will here give a brief explanation of each of these societal views 
on rape:
1) A proprietary view: Under this view, women are seen as the property of their male 
relatives. This means that if a man rapes a woman he is not married to, it is considered 
a crime against her male “owners”. The perpetrators’ punishment often differs based on 
the marriage status of the victim, since having sex with another man’s wife is considered 
worse than sex with an unmarried woman. Whether the relation was rape or consensual 
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sex is not necessarily considered important by the law. The woman does not have 
the legal right to consent and is often not seen as responsible, even when voluntarily 
engaging in fornication or adultery, while the man is punished regardless, since even 
consenting sex with her is a crime against her male relatives. In the proprietary view, 
marriage becomes the thing that makes sex legal. Since the husband becomes the new 
“owner” of the woman, this means that he in practice has a license to have sex with her 
regardless of her consent. 
2) A theocentric view: Within the Abrahamic faiths, sex outside of marriage is generally 
considered illegal. However, in a theocentric view this is not seen as a crime against 
relatives, but as a crime against God. This means that under this societal view both 
the man and the woman are punished for fornication and adultery. As opposed to the 
proprietary view, their punishment will differ based on their own marriage status, since 
adultery is considered worse than fornication. Outside of marriage, it makes a difference 
whether the woman is raped or not, since she is only punished for intentionally 
participating in fornication or adultery. However, since only sex outside of marriage is 
seen as a crime against God, rape within marriage is also not considered a crime. 
3) A morality view: If a society no longer views religion as being a valid reason for 
regulations, then another argument against rape can be morality. The main aim of 
this regulation is not the protection of the individual’s autonomy but of the moral 
standards of society. This may lead to prohibition against adultery or even fornication, 
but generally rape is seen as worse due to the threat to society’s order. However, in this 
view there is no direct reason for criminalizing rape within marriage, which might be 
regarded as a private issue that the wider society should not interfere with.
4) An autonomy (individualist) view: Under this view, both men and women are 
considered individuals who have the right to bodily autonomy. This means that it 
is seen as a crime to force them into having sex. In this understanding, it becomes 
irrelevant whether this crime takes place inside or outside of marriage, since a spouse 
does not have a license to disregard the other spouse’s autonomy. On the other hand, 
men and women are free to engage in adultery and fornication as they please. 
Thus, to summarize: In the proprietary view the man is punished for sex outside of 
marriage, and the worst crime is sex with another man’s wife, regardless of whether 
it is rape or not. In the theocentric view, both parties are punished for sex outside 
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of marriage, but not if they have been raped, and the worst crime is having sex with 
someone else when you yourself is married. In the morality view, rape is seen as worse 
than adultery and fornication, but is still only a crime outside of marriage. In the 
autonomy view, it is rape that is forbidden, regardless of whether it is inside or outside 
of marriage. Only in the last view is marital rape criminalized. 
Other reasons for regulating (or not regulating) rape could certainly be identified in 
other cultures or at other times than those we have investigated. Other elements could 
also be included in the analysis, we have e.g. not analyzed how the legislation differed in 
regards to same-sex relations, which is also influenced by the wider societal view. While 
we have decided on the exact definitions of these four categories, similar categories and 
explanations of the ideology behind legislation have been used by many other writers, 
which we have sought inspiration from (Azam, 2015; Conley, 2014; Dübeck, 2003).
The four descriptions above are ideal types of these views. As we will show below, 
societies generally lean more towards one view than other views. However, the change 
from one view to another can be gradual or contested, which means that two or more 
views might influence the legislation simultaneously. 
Another important distinction lies in the definition of rape. In this article, two 
main definitions of rape will be discussed: 1) The violence-based definition, which 
criminalizes rape if the perpetrator has used violence or threat of violence. In this 
definition, having sex with someone against their will without using any violence is 
legal. 2) The consent-based definition, which criminalizes intercourse if one party did 
not consent to it, regardless of whether violence was used. Recently, Denmark has 
decided to move from a violence-based definition to a consent-based definition. During 
these discussions, a third definition was suggested: A voluntary-based definition, which 
criminalizes intercourse if one party did not voluntarily participate (Criminal Law 
Council, 2020). This definition is quite close to the consent-based definition. They 
differ in particular circumstances, where voluntary-based legislation would require 
the victim to signalize that they do not want the intercourse, while consent-based 
legislation leads to conviction as long as the victim did not signalize that they wanted 
the intercourse. It has been argued that the difference between these two definitions 
is miniscule (Vestergaard 2020). However, the consent-based definition makes it the 
responsibility of the person initiating the sexual intercourse to ensure that the other 
party has consented.
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While these distinctions are used by Danish legal scholars, it is important to note that 
they are also to some extent ideal types and that the legislation might gradually change 
from one to another, as discussed in the following. 
Other important distinctions relate to how the crime is proven. This is especially 
important in rape cases, since they are often difficult to prove. A very important element 
is the burden of proof. Is it the accused or the victim who has to prove what happened? 
Another important element concerns which arguments can be used in court. Is e.g. the 
victim’s chasteness, class and caste, the parties’ prior relationship or how quickly the 
crime was reported relevant as evidence? Our article does not systematically analyze 
the historical development of rules on evidence, which were of course very different 
before modern methods of evidence collection. In both Denmark and Pakistan today, 
the burden of proof in rape cases is on the prosecutor, since the accused is considered 
innocent until proven otherwise. In regulations that forbids adultery and fornication, 
the burden of proof can land on the victim to prove that it was indeed rape (only the 
perpetrator is punished) and not consensual sex (both are punished) depending on 
the exact definitions of these crimes and the rules on evidence. We will include rules 
on evidence in our analysis, when it is relevant for our main arguments. We will e.g. 
discuss the importance of the regulation in Pakistan, where the official definition of 
rape is focused on consent, but where case law suggests that the victim will frequently 
have to show evidence of violence to prove the non-consent, which in reality makes the 
application of the legislation violence-based.
Historical regulation in Denmark
We have investigated the oldest legal development in Denmark through existing 
literature. After the democratic constitutions, we have investigated the development 
primarily through our own reading of the laws and amendments enacted. Thus, for this 
period our references will be directly to the laws instead of literature. 
In the following, we show how Danish legal history can be divided based on the four 
societal views described above. Thus, we have divided the history into four periods, 
which follow these four different views. However, as mentioned above, the development 
from one view to another happens gradually, which is also highlighted in the following. 
After our analysis of these four periods, we will look at the Danish decision in 2020 to 
change the definition of rape. 
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1) Before the Lutheran Reformation in 1536: Proprietary view
The proprietary view is clear in the earliest preserved Scandinavian laws, the Icelandic 
Grágás, written down in the 12th century. In these laws, it was the woman’s husband, 
father or other male relative that could sue the rapist (Dennis et al., 2000, p. 70). If 
an unmarried woman voluntarily engaged in sex, she owed her own legal guardian a 
compensation (Dennis et al., 2000, p. 75). There is no indication in these laws that a 
woman could sue her husband for rape. On the contrary, if a woman fled and avoided 
her husband, he could declare it illegal for anyone in Iceland to house her, effectively 
forcing her back home to him (Dennis et al., 2000, p. 77). 
The earliest recorded Danish laws are from the 13th century and have similar views. 
The man who had sex with an unmarried woman had to pay a compensation to her 
family (Koefoed, 2008, p. 80). However, in case of rape the money was to be used for 
the benefit of the woman or, according to some laws in Zealand, be given to the woman 
(Dübeck, 2003, p. 56). This is an early example of seeing the woman as the victim of 
rape.
As opposed to the Icelandic law, regardless of whether it was rape or not, the woman 
was considered to have been seduced and was not punished for sex before marriage 
(Koefoed, 2017; 2008, p. 80). Thus, she was seen as a passive element in these crimes, 
without any real agency of her own and not held responsible. There was no punishment 
for a man raping his own wife. Similarly, a man’s relations with other women were not 
a crime against his wife (Koefoed, 2008, pp. 80–81) i.e. his punishment did not differ 
based on whether he was married. Instead, whether the woman he had relations with 
was married influenced his punishment, highlighting that the concern was her male 
family members. 
In Jutland, the punishment for rape was instead outlawry, suggesting a deeper focus on 
rape as a societal crime. In 1396, the Danish Queen Margrete I further strengthened 
the idea of rape as a societal crime by introducing the term “kvindefred”, stating that 
women, similar to the church and farmers, had a special right to peace during warfare 
(Jacobsen, 2005). These regulations could be said to show early signs of the morality 
view we have described above, since their focus was more on the societal protection and 
stability than on protecting the rights of the male family members.
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2) From Reformation in 1536 until democratic constitution in 1849: Theocentric view
Especially following the Lutheran Reformation, Danish laws became more strongly 
influenced by both Biblical principles and newer Christian ideas (Tamm, 2005, p. 168). 
This includes the theocentric view of rape described above. 
Interestingly, the Bible itself contains a mixture of the theocentric and the proprietary 
view. Mosaic Law regulates rape in Deuteronomy 22, 23-29. According to this, if 
a man had sex with another man’s fiancée, both he and the woman were stoned to 
death, unless the woman was considered to have screamed for help. If a man raped 
an unmarried woman, he had to pay her father a compensation and marry her. As we 
see, the man’s punishment did not differ based on whether it was rape or not. It only 
differed based on the civil status of the woman. Together with the compensation to the 
father, this links with the proprietary view. However, the strict punishment of stoning, 
which is not to the benefit of the male relatives, and the fact that both the man and the 
(engaged) woman are held responsible for breaking the rules, link with the theocentric 
view. There is no mentioned regulation of marital rape. 
Following the Reformation in Denmark, voluntary sex outside of marriage was still 
illegal, but the view on the crime had changed. Any married person who committed 
adultery was to be killed (Koefoed, 2008, p. 85), although the rules were softened in the 
Code of Denmark, generally requiring repeat offences before death penalty was applied 
(Koefoed, 2008, pp. 87, 108; Code of Denmark 6-13-24). Thus, as opposed to both 
earlier Danish law and Deuteronomy, the man’s crime was now that he had broken his 
own marriage vows and his promise to God, in line with the theocentric view we have 
described. Similar to Deuteronomy, women were seen as playing an active role in the 
crime and could be held accountable for their own actions. While the view before the 
Reformation had been that an unmarried woman naturally must have been seduced by 
the man and therefore was not to be punished, the idea that women were active agents 
spread, maybe influenced by the Church’s view of Eve as the temptress (Dübeck, 2003, 
p. 69).  This also had a role in rape cases. Laws from 1582 gave death penalty for rape 
of chaste women (Dübeck, 2003, p. 59), introducing a difference between whether the 
woman was known for being chaste or not, which would persist until 1930. Raping 
an unchaste woman was not punishable in itself, but a man who raped several women 
without marrying any of them could receive death penalty for this, regardless of whether 
the women had been chaste or not (Koefoed, 2008, pp. 94–95). An even clearer 
expression of this idea of “tempting women” influencing the legislation appears in 1734. 
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Until then, an unmarried man who had sex with an unmarried woman was obligated to 
marry her, if she wanted this. This obligation was removed due to the impression that 
women were luring men into sexual relations as a way of forcing them into marriage. 
Suddenly, society saw the man as the victim of the premarital relation and the woman as 
the seducing party (Koefoed, 2008, p. 309). 
Marital rape was still not a crime, and the rules generally encouraged marriage, e.g. 
by reducing or dropping the punishment for unmarried fornicators who chose to get 
married (Dübeck, 2003, pp. 60–61; Code of Denmark 6-13-1; Koefoed, 2008, p. 106). 
3) The first criminal code of the democratic era: Morality view
Denmark had its first democratic constitution in 1849 and a new criminal code in 1866 
replaced the older laws. It removed the punishment for sex before marriage. However, 
it continued to be a punishable crime for a married person to engage in sex outside of 
marriage until 1930. 
In 1866, the article on rape was placed in the chapter on vice crimes, suggesting that 
it was seen as a crime because it transgressed public morality, in accordance with the 
morality view on rape we described above. The article has remained in that chapter until 
today, which was criticized by Amnesty International in 2008 for conveying “a message 
that rape violates public morals, rather than the rights of an individual” and for still 
reflecting the original intention of the legislation as being “the protection not of the 
individual, but of the moral standards of society as a whole” (Amnesty International, 
2008)
The law in 1866 criminalized the husband who forced his wife to have sexual 
intercourse with other men, but the punishment was less than for rape, and there was 
no mention of the possibility of punishing a husband for raping his own wife, although 
the law also did not directly state the opposite. 
4) Since 1866: Towards an autonomy view
Despite the article remaining in the chapter on vice crimes, it is our impression that 
the reasoning for rape being a crime quickly changed. In writings from the early 20th 
century, the Danish legal thinkers began arguing that the crime of rape was a crime 
against the woman’s sexual autonomy (Dübeck, 2003, p. 74). This did not immediately 
lead to major changes in the rape regulation. It is our conclusion that the autonomy 
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view on rape has slowly but surely influenced the legislation until the confrontation 
between the old views and the new view has come to a final (for now) confrontation in 
debates going on right now in Denmark.
Over the last 150 years, especially two tendencies have shown themselves in changes to 
rape legislation. 
One tendency influenced by the autonomy view has been to include more and more 
types of violations in the definition of rape, slowly changing the definition of rape from 
violence-based towards consent-based.
The central article on rape from 1866 was fully violence-based and only included forced 
intercourse through “violence or threats of immediate life-threatening violence” in its 
definition (although other articles criminalized other sexual crimes, such as intercourse 
with an unconscious woman). The 1930 law widened the definition of rape to “forced 
intercourse with a woman through violence, deprivation of liberty or by causing fear 
for her or her loved one’s life, health or well-being”, thus the focus was no longer 
only on immediate life-threatening violence. In 1967, the definition also came to 
include cases where a man had deliberately put a woman into a defenseless state (e.g. 
by drugging her) and then had intercourse with her. In 1981, it was further widened 
to include all threats of violence, not just those that caused fear for life or well-being. 
Simultaneously, the article was rewritten in a gender-neutral language, so that it now 
also included a woman raping a man. In 2013, the article was changed again to include 
any kind of intercourse achieved by illegal coercion, as well as intercourse with any 
person in a defenseless state (regardless of whether the perpetrator had placed them in 
that state himself ). In this regard, illegal coercion included e.g. acquiring intercourse 
with a woman (or a man) by threatening to otherwise disclose to others that she has 
committed a crime, that she has been unfaithful or any other matters of private life 
that she would prefer to keep secret. The Criminal Law Council specifically considered 
in 2013 whether the legislation should be changed to consent-based, but rejected the 
idea (Vestergaard, 2019). However, as our description shows, there has been a gradual 
movement from the violence-based definition towards a consent-based definition, by 
including more and more in the definition of rape. It should be noted that some of 
these actions were also illegal in Danish law earlier than the year mentioned here, but 
were not defined as rape and were regulated by other articles. Thus, the movement 
has especially been towards including more and more in the legal definition of rape. 
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However, even after the change in 2013, having intercourse with a conscious person 
who had not consented and who did not want to have sex was still legal in Denmark, if 
there had been no forms of violence, threats or illegal coercion. This has led up to the 
2020 decision on whether the legislation should be changed to a consent-based. 
The other tendency influenced by the autonomy view has been a move towards also 
punishing husbands and other partners for rape. 
In 1930, the law made it possible to punish for marital rape. However, while the law 
also removed the chaste vs unchaste distinction in rape cases, the law instead introduced 
a new distinction, with less severe punishment for a man raping a woman he was in a 
lasting sexual relationship with. Similarly, other sexual crimes than rape, such as having 
sex with an unconscious woman, was still not illegal within marriage. The law also 
reinvented the rule that the punishment was remitted or reduced if the parties married 
after the rape. In 1967, the less severe punishment for rape in lasting relationships was 
officially removed. Yet, in 1981, the legislator noticed that jurors often acquitted rapists 
of art. 216 (rape by use of violence or threat of violence) and instead convicted them 
of the lesser crime in art 217 (intercourse achieved by other forms of illegal coercion), 
despite violence having been used. This primarily happened in cases where the man and 
the woman had known each other before the rape, showing that the change in 1967 had 
not penetrated fully into court practice (Criminal Law Council, 2012, p. 150). The law 
was changed again to prevent this practice. In 2013, the rule allowing for remittance of 
punishment if the rapist married the victim was removed and all articles were changed 
to also apply within marriage. Thus, while the law began recognizing rape in marriage in 
1930, it originally had several reservations, which has only gradually been removed. 
5) The 2020 decision: Autonomy and consent
Legal scholars supporting a consent-based legislation have argued that it would 
strengthen the protection of sexual autonomy (Vestergaard, 2019), in accordance with 
the trend we have identified since 1866. Contrary to this, a Danish law professor in 
2019 criticized that such legislation could make it illegal for a husband to pressure his 
wife into having sex with him by threatening divorce (Madsen, 2019). This highlights 
an existing cultural conflict concerning autonomy and the extent to which pressure 
should be legal in marital relations. 
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In 2020, the Danish Criminal Law Council (Straffelovrådet) gave their 
recommendations on the matter. The council had found several problematic Danish 
court cases that had led to acquittal. The cases that the Council mentioned in their 
report included a case where a woman had tried to push away her boyfriend but had 
eventually felt pressured to go through with the intercourse, because she did not want 
conflict in the house or for an argument to happen. Other cases referred to by the 
Council, which did not involve boyfriends, included 1) a woman who said no, but had 
then felt paralyzed and unable to resist when the man anyway initiated intercourse; 2) 
a 16-year old girl alone in a bathroom with three men, who clearly said no, but did 
not try to leave; and 3) a woman who was in a bathroom with a man, where he turned 
her around, pulled her pants down and initiated intercourse, while she was saying no. 
In these cases, the women had not consented to the intercourse, but none of these 
cases had been considered illegal under the Danish legislation, since there had been 
no violence or illegal coercion involved (Criminal Law Council, 2020, pp. 125–127, 
200–202). 
The Criminal Law Council highlighted the importance of protecting the victim’s right 
to self-determination and recommended legal change, but the members were divided 
on how to change the law. The majority suggested a voluntary-based definition, while a 
minority of only one person suggested a consent-based. These terms are discussed above 
in our framework. The defining example used by the council was two people partying 
together with sexual communication or touching, going home together, voluntarily 
taking off their clothes and lying down in bed together. In this situation, if one party 
initiates sex, while the other party stays completely passive, the voluntary-based 
definition would not consider it rape (Criminal Law Council, 2020, p. 136). It was not 
explained what this would mean for married couples, who could often find themselves 
in that situation. 
The minority in the council insisted that rape should not be defined in the victim’s 
lack of opposition, but rather in both parties mutual interest in sex. The minority 
felt the need to make sure that situations where the victim had been passive were 
also criminalized, such as when feeling paralyzed and situations inside marriage or 
relationships where one party due to despair or fear is unable to resist (Criminal Law 
Council, 2020, p. 169). Under the consent-based definition, the initiating partner has a 
responsibility of ensuring that a passive partner has consented to the intercourse. 
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Shortly before the publication of this article, a new definition of rape was implemented 
in Danish law. The new definition follows the consent-based view proposed by the 
minority in the Criminal Law Council. Thus, the new legal definition of rape is 
“intercourse with a person, who has not consented to it”. The change came into effect 
on 1 January 2021. 
Historical regulation in Muslim law
Since Pakistan has only been independent since 1947, we will first look historically 
at how Muslim law regulated rape before turning to the modern development in 
Pakistan. For centuries following the rise of Islam, judges in the Muslim world would 
decide cases based on interpretations of the primary and secondary sources of Islam. 
This has changed in modern time, especially following the colonial era, where ideas 
from Western law have spread or directly been imposed on many Muslim countries 
(Anderson, 1990). However, concepts and ideas from earlier applications of Muslim 
law continue to play a role in many Muslim countries, including Pakistan (Pearl and 
Menski, 1998; Mehdi, 1994).
There is not just one interpretation of Islam’s sources. Denominations such as Shia 
and Sunni have different theological interpretations of the sources. Traditional Sunni 
Islam further consist of different legal schools, called “madhhabs”, which have derived 
different rules from the Islamic sources. The two oldest are the Hanafi madhhab and 
the Maliki madhhab, which originated 150 years after the death of the Prophet (Hallaq, 
2009, pp. 63–64). Both before and after this time, other competing interpretations have 
also existed. In our time, feminist interpretations of Islam are one of these competing 
voices. Within each madhhab, there is agreement on certain rules and methodological 
principles. However, in concrete legal questions, it is also normal to find some 
disagreements within a madhhab, since it has developed over generations through 
internal debate (Hallaq, 2009, p. 65). 
Within the discourse of the legal tradition, it is common to divide criminal 
punishments into different categories, including: 1) Hudood (Singular: Hadd) are 
punishments directly prescribed in the sources of Islam (Noor, 2010). If an accused is 
found guilty of a Hadd offence, the judge will apply the exact punishment prescribed 
by Islam. Hudood are seen as crimes against God, so the judge or ruler cannot pardon 
a person found guilty of these crimes (Munir, 2009) but they can also not apply the 
punishments unless a number of strict criteria have been fulfilled. 2) Ta’zir refers to 
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discretionary punishments, i.e. offences forbidden by Islam but for which the judge 
can decide whether to punish and (within certain limits) which punishment to apply 
(Peters, 2009, p. 68; Munir, 2009). 3) Syasa can be translated to policy, and is the 
discretionary power of the ruler to make something illegal and prescribe a punishment. 
In contemporary usages, Syasa and Ta’zir are often seen as the same category (Munir, 
2009). 
1) Early Muslim law: Theocentric view with a focus on consent
The Quran forbids sex outside of marriage, including both adultery and fornication, 
which under one term is called “zina” (Quran 24.2). The Quran does not say anything 
directly about rape (Quraishi, 1997, p. 302), neither inside nor outside of marriage. 
Similar to the Bible, various statements telling husband and wife to be good to each 
other can be understood to mean that it is morally wrong to rape your spouse, but there 
is no direct mention of it being a criminal offence
The theocentric view on legislation is clear already in the beginning of Islam in the 
7th century. In these rules, women and men were given the same punishment for zina 
(illegal sexual intercourse) (Bello, 2011, p. 171) and their punishment depended on 
their own civil status, similar to the laws written after the Reformation in Denmark. In 
the most prevalent early interpretations of Muslim law, a married person committing 
zina was stoned to death, while an unmarried was flogged 100 times. The Quran only 
mentions flogging as a punishment and makes no distinction in punishment based on 
civil status, but early jurists used other sources of Islam to argue for this distinction 
and the punishment of stoning. Thus, the punishment for zina was considered a Hadd 
punishment. 
Early Muslim jurists saw the criminalization of rape in light of the prohibition on 
adultery (Noor, 2010, p. 429). Thus, the consequence of rape, i.e. forced zina, was 
primarily that a raped woman was not punished for zina, because she had been forced. 
The rapist was given the same punishment for rape as he would have been given for zina 
(Noor, 2010, p. 431). This also meant that marital rape was not considered, since zina 
could not take place in a marriage. 
Muslim scholars thoroughly discussed and gave examples of different forms of duress 
that negated a woman’s consent and therefore meant that she should not be punished 
for zina (Quraishi, 1997, p. 314). This included not only violent rape, but also having 
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zina with a sleeping or insane person or with a minor (Azam, 2015, pp. 103, 114, 132, 
134). There are also examples of early Muslim rulers accepting that socio-economic 
factors could force a woman to engage in sexual acts, she would otherwise not have 
desired, and that she should therefore not be punished for such actions (Azam, 2015, 
p. 102; 2012, p. 456). Thus, the focus was not on violence, but on whether the woman 
had willingly participated in zina or not. 
2) The madhhabs: Influences from proprietary, theocentric and autonomy views
Interestingly, Azam has shown that already at the time of the madhhabs, there were 
at least two different views on the crime of rape (forced zina), which she herself 
distinguishes as proprietary and theocentric (Azam, 2015). She has found that the 
Hanafi madhhab viewed rape very similarly to our theocentric category. On the other 
hand, the Maliki madhhab viewed the female sexuality as a property and rape as a 
proprietary crime, somewhat similar to our proprietary category, although with the 
important difference that the woman herself was seen as the owner, not her male 
relatives. This in reality also makes this view somewhat similar to our autonomy 
category, since she was to be compensated if raped because her rights had been violated. 
Of course, there are also obvious differences to the autonomy view, such as marital 
rape not being a crime in the Maliki view and men and women not being allowed to 
consent to zina. Since the Maliki madhhab was also influenced by the theocentric views 
described above, it is an interesting mix of several different concerns. 
This difference in how rape was classified had practical implications. Similar to zina, 
the Hanafis viewed rape as a crime towards God with no human victim. Therefore, the 
rapist was punished but did not have to pay any compensation to the woman for the 
sexual violation (Azam, 2015, pp. 156, 158). The Malikis disagreed and both punished 
the man and demanded that he paid compensation to the woman (Azam, 2015, pp. 
130–31). The two remaining Sunni madhhabs, Shafiis and Hanbalis, agreed with the 
Malikis on this (Noor, 2010, p. 431).
The other practical implication had to do with the burden of proof.  For zina, 
traditionally the Hadd punishment was only carried out if the parties confessed freely 
or if four male witnesses had seen it take place. For this reason, many have described 
the rules as more symbolic, or as preventing the public spread of immorality but not the 
private (Quraishi, 1997, p. 296). 
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Since the Hanafis regarded rape as a Hadd like zina, a rapist could also only be punished 
if he confessed or if four male witnesses had seen the crime (Azam, 2015, pp. 188, 195). 
Historically, it seems that Hanafis did not allow judges to apply Ta’zir punishment in 
rape cases where this strict evidentiary criteria for Hadd had not been fulfilled (Azam 
2015, p. 195). Ta’zir, the ability of a judge to apply a discretionary punishment, was 
reserved for crimes that did not fall under the definition of zina (and forced zina), e.g. 
anal sex (Azam, 2015, p. 173), while in cases concerning zina (and forced zina) Hanafi 
scholars applied the rules on Hadd, including the very strict evidence rules. If these were 
not met, Ta’zir was also not an option and the rapist/adulterer was not punished. 2
As opposed to this, the Malikis clearly allowed for the woman to raise a rape case as 
a Ta’zir procedure and thereby purely on circumstantial evidence, such as her having 
screamed, immediately reporting the crime, bleeding afterwards etc. (Azam, 2015, p. 
208). If the woman won such a circumstantial rape charge, the man was not stoned, 
since he had not been found guilty of the Hadd punishment, but he had to pay her a 
compensation and the judge could give him a discretionary punishment (Azam, 2015, 
pp. 210, 222, 225–27). However, the Malikis also allowed circumstantial evidence 
in zina cases. This meant that a pregnant unmarried woman could be punished for 
zina, unless she was able to prove that she had been raped. The Hanafis disagreed and 
accepted that neither the man nor the woman could be punished without witnesses. 
Neither of the madhhabs recognized marital rape as a crime, although they did allow a 
woman to seek punishment of or compensation from her husband, if he caused damage 
to her during sex, e.g. through perineal tearing (Azam, 2015, p. 19).
3) Ongoing discussions in modern times
These disagreements between madhhabs show the diversity within Muslim law. Despite 
both legal traditions using the same sources, they reached different results based on 
interpretations and categorizations. This diversity in classical Muslim law leaves a door 
open for modern Muslim reformers to suggest other categorizations of rape, which 
could potentially include marital rape. One modern tendency among Muslim thinkers 
2 As opposed to Azam’s conclusions on this, Baldwin (2012, p. 128) says in the context of Ot-
toman Hanafi jurists that they could apply Ta’zir, when the strict evidence criteria for a Hadd 
crime had not been met. However, Baldwin’s reference for this information, Peters (2009, pp. 
65-67), appear to be talking generally about the concept of Ta’zir across the different madh-
habs and not specifically about the Hanafi madhhab or Ottomans. 
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is to categorize rape as a violent crime, similar to other forms of assault (Noor, 2010, 
pp. 434–435). This categorization can also find support in opinions among earlier 
scholars (Quraishi, 1997, p. 315-319). Quraishi suggests including the crime of rape 
under Hirabah (rape as a violent taking) and Jirah (rape as bodily harm). Others have 
suggested that Islam leaves it up to the rulers’ discretion to regulate and punish rape 
(Munir, 2009). These historic and modern disagreements show how the societal view 
on rape, be it proprietary, theocentric, moral or autonomy-focused, are also influencing 
how Islam’s rules on rape are interpreted and applied. 
Historical regulation in Pakistan
In the following, we will look at four historical periods: 1) The Muslim rule in 
Pakistan before colonization, 2) colonial time and early independence, 3) the Hudood 
Ordinances from 1979, and 4) the Women’s Protection Bill from 2006. 
1) Muslim rule: Diverse practices and local solutions
Discussions on the right regulation of rape and zina among Hanafi and Maliki scholars 
interpreting Islam does not necessarily correspond directly with how Muslim rulers and 
judges historically punished such crimes. The region of Sindh in modern day Pakistan 
was conquered by Muslims as early as 712. However, due to political, administrative 
and military difficulties, rules based on Islam were only systematically applied in 
this area from around 1204 (Fyzee, 1963, p. 401). Even then, application was not 
necessarily in accordance with the theoretical framework developed in the madhhabs. 
There are examples of sultans in the area pardoning and remitting Hadd punishments 
for adultery, despite the madhhabs not allowing this. However, there are also e.g. reports 
about a woman accused of adultery and many other crimes, who was sentenced by the 
Muslim emperor to be torn to pieces by dogs, a punishment completely unheard of 
within the scholarly legal tradition of Islam (Fyzee, 1963, p. 409). Thus, the Muslim 
rulers did not necessarily follow the madhhabs.  
We are not aware of any systematic analysis of how Muslim laws on rape and zina 
were applied during the Muslim rule of what is today Pakistan. Two things prevent a 
full analysis. First, there is not enough material about historical cases. Sangar suggests 
that due to the social stigma in relation to cases on zina, they were probably often 
dealt with between the involved families without being made public at court (1967, p. 
183). However, the lack of Mughal state archives also contribute to the lack of material 
(Pirbhai, 2016). Second, the pure diversity of practices makes it difficult to say anything 
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in general about this period. From around 1206-1526 the area that is today India and 
Pakistan was primarily ruled by various sultanates based in Delhi. Following this, the 
Mughal Empire ruled until the colonial time. However, parts of what is today Pakistan 
have also been ruled by e.g. the Timurid Empire and the Safavid Dynasty. The diversity 
in practices is partly due to the rulers having different approaches. However, another 
reason is that the central rulers often allowed freedom to settle disputes privately, e.g. 
through local arbiters or assemblies that used customary laws with only limited relation 
to the religious rules (Giunchi, 2010, p. 1121). Giunchi also mentions that disputes 
concerning honor were almost entirely solved outside of court. On the other hand, 
Pirbhai argues that earlier scholars have underestimated how often the official courts 
handled local criminal cases (2016). Official courts would make reference to Hanafi 
interpretations of Islam. However, judges might dissent from the official opinions of the 
madhhab if they found other options more suited for the community (Giunchi, 2010, 
p. 1122). To some extent, this is fully within the Hanafi methodology, which allowed 
for taking culture and context into consideration (Giunchi, 2010; Pirbhai, 2016). Thus, 
the legal application in these times was flexible and dependent on context, which also 
made them ambiguous. 
It is outside the scope of this article to do a deeper analysis of the societal views 
influencing these various applications. Theocentric influences from Islam and the 
Hanafi madhhab prevalent in this area likely had influence, but if cases were solved 
privately by families due to issues of honor and social stigma, it would suggest that 
proprietary concerns also had a role. 
When the East Indian Company first began the colonization process of the Mughal 
Empire, they originally wanted to apply the area’s own laws, including the traditional 
Muslim law, although with the caveat that application of these laws should not be seen 
as contrary to the laws of England. In 1748, it was directly stated that this principle 
should also be applied for the regulation of sex offences, which meant application of 
Muslim law for Muslims (Giunchi, 2010, p. 1126). However, the British authorities 
wanted a clear and easily implementable law and did not take inspiration from the 
more pragmatic approach that Muslim judges had historically used. They also largely 
ignored the written collections on Muslim law that the Mughal emperors had gathered 
(Pirbhai, 2016). Instead, they used classical Hanafi books, primarily the 12th century 
book Al-Hidaya (Giunchi, 2010, p. 1127; Hallaq, 2009, p. 374). The British created 
a codification of one opinion within the Hanafi madhhab, excluding a variety of 
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contradicting opinions and nuances as well as the ability to take culture and context 
into consideration (Hallaq, 2009, p. 376). It was the first time that a unified Muslim 
law was applied within this area (Giunchi, 2010, p. 1129), but it was heavily influenced 
by the British legal perspective and was therefore an interesting mix of traditions that 
became known as Anglo-Muhammedan law (Hallaq, 2009, p. 377). The Muslim laws 
were altered in areas where they did not fit the British view on law and from 1790 
to 1861, British criminal law gradually replaced Muslim law. The tendency in Hadd 
regulation to have very strict evidentiary criteria, making it difficult to convict criminals 
of these crimes, was found too lenient by the British (Hallaq, 2009, p. 378). Thus, 
while punishments like stoning and flogging were banned or restricted over time, the 
actual number of people punished for zina grew dramatically (Giunchi, 2010, p. 1131). 
This may suggest that the lack of documented zina cases from the earlier period was 
not only due to families hiding the cases from public view. It might also be because the 
population knew that it was difficult to get anyone convicted of zina and rape under the 
traditional Muslim laws. Eventually, a new penal code was drafted by the British, which 
replaced the Muslim laws completely. 
2) Colonial Penal Code: Moral and proprietary, non-consent proven through violence
Pakistan inherited the Indian Penal Code (since then called the Pakistan Penal Code) 
from 1860 as their criminal code. This Penal Code was made during the British 
colonization of India and Pakistan and was based on the English law on rape (Kolsky, 
2010). It continued to be in use until 1979 with only few changes. 
Before 1979, the wording of section 375 was:
A man is said to commit “rape” who except in the case hereinafter 
excepted, has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances 
falling under any of the five following descriptions:
First.– Against her will.
Secondly.– Without her consent.
Thirdly.– With her consent, when her consent has been obtained by 
putting her in fear of death, or of hurt.
164 Naveiñ Reet: Nordic Journal of Law and Social Research (NNJLSR) No. 10 2020
Fourthly.– With her consent, when the man knows that he is not her 
husband, and that her consent is given because she believes that he is 
another man to whom she is or believes herself to be lawfully married. 
Fifthly.– With or without her consent, when she is under [sixteen] years 
of age.
Explanation.– Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse 
necessary to the offense of rape. 
Exception.– Sexual intercourse by a man with his own wife, the wife not 
being under [fifteen] years of age, is not rape. 
The age of consent was originally ten years of age in 1860, and the same was the case for 
the age mentioned in the exception-clause, which allows for marital rape as long as the 
wife is not below a certain age (Vibhute, 2001, p. 27). Both this age and the general age 
of consent were raised several times over the years (Law Commission of India, 1997, pp. 
144-145).
Interestingly, the definition of rape in section 375 of this Code includes a man having 
sexual intercourse with a woman “against her will” or “without her consent”. Thus, 
already in 1860, the written law in what would become Pakistan defined rape based 
on whether the woman had willingly participated. Violence is also part of the written 
definition, but only to make sure that a woman violently forced into “consenting” is 
also considered raped. However, while the definition includes a focus on consent and 
willingness, this does not mean that the application of the law focused on the woman’s 
consent the same way the new Danish legislation is expected to do. 
Kolsky has shown from case law in colonial India in the years leading up to 1947, that 
in the absence of violence and other circumstantial evidence colonial judges presumed 
that the woman had consented, and therefore based their decisions on other factors 
than the woman’s testimony. These factors included discussions on the woman’s previous 
sexual history, but the most important evidence was signs on the woman’s body of her 
having violently resisted. Consent was inferred from non-resistance, and no physical 
signs of resistance therefore meant acquittal (Kolsky, 2010). Thus, the application of 
the regulation was violence-based if we are to apply the terminology from the Danish 
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debate. Examples of these practices include a case from the Lahore High Court in 1935, 
in which four men were found guilty of breaking into a woman’s house and abducting 
her. Despite this, they were not found guilty of rape, since there were no marks of 
injury to the woman’s vagina. In a case from 1933, the Oudh Chief Court held that 
“the first and foremost circumstance that can be looked for in a case of rape is evidence 
of resistance which one would normally expect from a women unwilling to yield to 
a sexual intercourse forced upon her” (Kolsky, 2010, p. 121). Especially lower-class 
women were expected to put up their utmost resistance and therefore found it difficult 
to get a rapist convicted, even when some signs of violence were present (Kolsky, 2010). 
In a case from 1907, a female beggar claimed to have been raped by two men on a path 
close to a temple. She had screamed for help, which attracted nearby villagers who saw 
signs of struggle when they arrived. Clear signs of violence were found on her body. 
Yet, the Kathiawad Chief Court found that there were no signs of “real struggle” since 
she was a “strong and mature woman”. The court also found that the physical signs of 
violence could simply be the result of the kind of sex people of “such low class” engaged 
in, including the fact that they had not cared to find a fitting site before engaging in the 
intercourse (Kolsky, 2010, p. 117). 
It is our impression that the regulation can widely be included under the morality 
view on rape. The rape laws did not treat women as property of male relatives, but the 
focus seems to have been more on the protection of the society than on the individual 
woman’s autonomy. However, other provisions clearly highlighted that the proprietary 
view also influenced the legislation, for example Section 497, which criminalized 
adultery, but only for a man having intercourse with a married woman. The married 
woman was not punished, and neither was a married man who committed adultery 
with an unmarried woman. Thus, adultery was treated as a man’s crime against the 
woman’s husband. Similarly, section 375 only criminalized a man raping a woman, not 
the opposite. 
3) Hudood Ordinances in 1979: Same legislation in a new disguise
Pakistan went through an islamization-process, which led to new criminal laws in 1979, 
entitled the Hudood Ordinances (Bubb, 2007, p. 71). 
One of the new ordinances was the Zina Ordinance, which criminalized fornication 
and adultery, allegedly in accordance with classical interpretations of Islam, including 
the same punishments i.e. either stoning or flogging depending on the marital status, 
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if the requirements of e.g. four witnesses were met (Cheema, 2006, p. 134). However, 
if the strict criteria for evidence were not met the Ordinance also allowed for Ta’zir 
as an alternative punishment, which could lead to imprisonment and until 1996 
also to flogging (Rathore, 2015, p. 9; Shah, 2010, p. 3). The Ordinance became very 
controversial and was criticized for not following the spirit of Islam, lacking public 
consensus and resulting in injustice against victims of rape (Mehdi 1990; 1992). 
Especially the inclusion of Ta’zir as a possible punishment for zina was criticized, since it 
made it much easier to prosecute women for zina, e.g. when they were unable to prove 
that they had been raped (Quraishi, 1999, p. 416).  
The legislation placed rape as a subcategory of the wider crime of zina (fornication and 
adultery), calling it zina-bil-jabr (Literally: zina through force) and also here required 
four male eyewitnesses for Hadd and otherwise allowed for Ta’zir (Rathore, 2015, p. 
10). The wording of the article of zina-bil-jabr was: 
A person is said to commit zina-bil-jabr if he or she has sexual intercourse 
with a woman or man, as the case may be, to whom he or she is not 
validly married, in any of the following circumstances, namely:
(a) against the will of the victim;
(b) without the consent of the victim; 
(c) with the consent of the victim, when the consent has been obtained 
by putting the victim in fear of death or of hurt; or
(d) with the consent of the victim, when the offender knows that the 
offender is not validly married to the victim and that the consent is given 
because the victim believes that the offender is another person to whom 
the victim is or believes herself or himself to be validly married.
Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual intercourse 
necessary to the offence of zina-bil-jabr.
The law clearly excluded marital rape from the provision. While the Federal Shariat 
Court directly stated that the new law was a “complete departure” from the previous 
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legislation (Cheema, 2006, p. 132), it is nevertheless striking how similar the actual 
wording of the provision of zina-bil-jabr was to the previous colonial rape legislation 
(Quraishi, 1999, p. 414). One obvious similarity is that the written definition of zina-
bil-jabr in the law used almost the exact same wording on consent and willingness as the 
colonial law. Interestingly, as opposed to the earlier legislation, the article was gender 
neutral and explicitly stated that a man could be the victim of zina-bil-jabr. 
Practically, the Hadd punishments for zina and zina-bil-jabr were never carried out, 
due to the difficulty in providing enough evidence (Cheema, 2006, p. 151), making the 
Ta’zir regulation the primary practical regulation. Despite the consent-based wording, 
there were examples of cases where the intercourse had been established, but the male 
rapist was only convicted of zina instead of zina-bil-jabr, because the woman had not 
put up a struggle (Mehdi, 2003). Thus, not only the statutory wording but also the case 
law on rape borrowed many elements from colonial practices, including a focus on the 
moral character of the woman and physical signs of her utmost resistance. Elements, 
which were foreign to traditional Muslim law (Kolsky, 2010). 
Thus, while the new laws were clearly claimed to be of the theocentric view, as opposed 
to the colonial law, the actual change specifically in regards to rape was miniscule. 
However, the new criminalization of adultery and fornication had direct consequences 
in rape cases. Firstly, rapists could no longer get out of punishment merely by claiming 
that the sex was consensual, since that could lead to them (but also their victim) 
being punished for zina instead (Cheema, 2018). Secondly, over the years, several 
cases from the lower courts in Pakistan received great criticism and media attention 
because women were sentenced to punishment for zina, either because a pregnancy was 
considered evidence or because them accusing a man of rape was seen as a confession 
to zina. When the cases were appealed to the Federal Shariat Court, these arguments 
would generally be rejected and the women acquitted, which shows the court preferring 
the view of the Hanafi (and Shafii) madhhab on this topic (Cheema, 2006, p. 149). 
However, since Zina was not a bailable offence, these women would often have spent 
several years in jail at that time and had become ostracised by their families (Lau, 2007; 
Shah, 2010, p. 4). 
4) Women’s Protection Bill: Going backwards to go forwards?
The criticism of the law led to changes in 2006, when the Women’s Protection Bill 
was passed. The change was supported both through arguments on women’s rights 
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and feminism, but also by theological arguments stating that the correct application of 
Islamic law was more women-friendly (Lau, 2007). 
The change in 2006 meant reinstating the old rape provision from the Pakistan Penal 
Code that had existed before the Zina Ordinance, which means that the legislation 
continues to define rape as lack of consent and as being against the will of the victim. 
While rape was removed from the Zina Ordinance, Hadd punishment for adultery and 
fornication is still regulated by the Ordinance. Ta’zir punishment for zina was removed 
from the ordinance, instead a new provision regulating these crimes was implemented 
in the Pakistan Penal Code (Shah, 2010, p. 5). Thus, the current legislation is 
influenced both by colonial and Hadd-legislation and is therefore also still influenced by 
the societal views, which created these legislations. 
The reinstatement of the colonial rape legislation came with the significant change 
that marital rape is no longer explicitly exempted from the rape provision (Cheema, 
2006, p. 159; Shah, 2010, p. 9). This was a progressive move not only compared to 
the Zina Ordinances, but also compared to the original rape provision from 1860 and 
to neighboring countries such as India, which continue to have a direct exemption for 
marital rape. While this would seem to mean that marital rape is now punishable in 
Pakistan, no such cases have been reported (Khan, 2020). 
Discussions on what it means to consent and how non-consent is proven continue in 
Pakistan (Munir, 2009). One critique from feminist voices has been that a woman in 
Pakistan threatened with divorce if she does not engage in sex cannot be considered 
to have consented to sex, since a divorce in Pakistan will often leave the woman 
economically destitute and socially stigmatized (Khan, 2020). Thus, as in Denmark, 
newer voices are insisting on autonomy being the central element in rape legislation. 
Reflections
Comparing the development in legislation in Denmark and Pakistan, including the 
historical regulation in Muslim law leads to valuable insights. First of all, we can see 
how the socio-economic development has led to a changed view of women, which 
has influenced the culture and the regulation, in particular during the last century. 
The growing presence of women in the labor market, politics and public debate is 
undoubtedly one factor that has led to new views on what constitutes rape. This 
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highlights the importance of including all members of society in the development of 
law. 
However, even more striking is the importance that the legal culture has. In both 
jurisdictions, rape has continued to be defined in accordance with the historical 
definition of rape in that legal system. In Denmark, rape has until 2021 been defined 
as involving violence, threat of violence or (more recently) illegal coercion, and legal 
scholars resisted a consent-based legislation. In contrast to this, a definition of rape that 
uses the term consent and is focused on the will of the victim has continued to exist in 
the written legislation of Pakistan, even as the legislation changed dramatically between 
secular and religious phrasing (and despite the actual application of the law mainly 
focusing on violence). It seems that jurists have a clear tendency to build on what is 
already present in the legal system, e.g. with Pakistan in 2006 reverting back to the 
wording in colonial law instead of developing an entirely new legislation
So far the legal culture, i.e. traditional legal concepts and definitions, have set the 
framework for the rape legislation, within which the socio-economic factors have been 
altering the legislation. However, in recent years the societal development seems to 
have changed the culture so much that the legal framework itself is now questioned. 
In Denmark, a completely new definition of rape has just been implemented, and in 
Pakistan, the Hudood-legislation has been altered through both secular and religious 
arguments, while feminist groups are pushing for even stronger change, also in relation 
to marital rape. 
As we have shown, the written definition of rape is not the only thing of importance. 
The wider societal views on women can influence legal scholars and judges in how 
they interpret the law. In both Denmark and Pakistan, decisions have been made by 
jurors or judges in the lower courts, which were in direct conflict with the official 
legislation or the application by the higher courts. However, even within the wording 
of a legislation, cultural views can strongly influence the interpretation. In Pakistan, the 
fact that the legislation uses consent to define rape became almost irrelevant, especially 
during colonial times, because case law was based on the assumption that women have 
consented, unless they have violently fought back against the perpetrator. In that regard, 
it will be interesting to follow how Danish judges will interpret the new consent-based 
Danish legislation. Will they also hold on to previous understandings of rape, despite 
the legislation having changed? 
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Not only interpretations of legal texts but also of religious texts can vary wildly based on 
cultural views, as we saw in the different applications of Muslim rules on rape from the 
Hanafi and Maliki madhhab, but also from newer competing interpretations. 
Thus, even the same text, legal or religious, can be interpreted and applied in very 
different ways depending on which of the four societal views, described by us, influence 
the interpreter. There are also other ways that culture can influence the exact outcome of 
marital rape cases, which we will look further at in the second part of this article. 
Part 2: Cultural influences in marital rape cases in Denmark
Method
Above, we looked at the cultural influences on legislation. However, legislation is not 
the only culturally influenced factor in court cases. In the following, we will analyze the 
two Danish court cases with the aim of identifying to which extent culture influenced 
the cases. To identify this, we have looked for arguments that either the parties, their 
lawyers or the judges based on culture. 
Both cases concern a woman accusing her former husband of rape in marriage with 
the couples having a background in Pakistan. However, they differ significantly from 
each other in their details. We have named one of the cases the “Conviction-case” and 
the other the “Acquittal-case”, due to the very different outcomes of the cases. Both 
cases were decided before the new consent-based definition of rape was implemented in 
Danish law. 
In regards to the Conviction-case, we identified the case through a short description 
on the court’s website and subsequently received access to documents in the case at 
both the city court and the high court. In regards to the Acquittal-case, the defendant 
in the case, who was worried whether culture and language barriers could affect his 
case negatively, approached Rubya Mehdi. Subsequently, Mikele Schultz-Knudsen 
attended the court proceedings to observe the case. We did not assist either side in 
the proceedings. It should be noted that Danish court practice prevents access to the 
full testimony of an alleged rape victim. For this reason, we have not had access to the 
testimony of the accusing ex-wives in these cases, but we have been able to see what the 
lawyers or the judges have described them as saying. 
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Most Danish court case transcripts are not publically available. Therefore, we were 
not able to determine how often (former) spouses are prosecuted for rape charges 
in Denmark. However, these cases are rare, with one lawyer in the Acquittal-case 
specifically stating that he had not been able to find similar cases to compare with. We 
chose these two cases, because we were able to get access to both and because of their 
similarity due to the shared Pakistani background. We are however aware of other cases 
involving rape between spouses, including a case involving a Christian man accused of 
raping his wife and forcing her into reading the Bible (Ritzau, 2020). The fact that our 
cases have a relation to Pakistan is therefore only due to the theme of this article. More 
research into other marital rape cases is needed. 
Description of the cases
The Conviction-case was decided in the City Court of Glostrup on 1 February 2019 
and was appealed to the Eastern High Court who decided on the case on 7 November 
2019. The defendant was accused of having abused his wife over a period of 5 years 
through both violence and rape. He was a Danish citizen, born in Denmark, with 
parents originally from Pakistan. In 2011, he was 19 and had an arranged marriage to a 
21-year old woman in Pakistan. According to the Danish Aliens Act art. 9, a citizen of 
another country can only get family reunification in Denmark if both husband and wife 
are above 24 years of age (a law specifically made to hinder arranged marriages). For 
this reason, after living separated for 2 years, the couple officially moved to Sweden, but 
after less than a month moved into his parents’ house in Denmark without notifying 
the authorities. Thus, the woman was in Denmark illegally and unable to get a job or 
use medical services. She had no network in Europe except people she met through 
her husband’s family. After five years, she alarmed her brother to her situation and 
he informed their sister who had since then moved to Italy. The sister made a visit 
to Denmark unannounced and convinced the husband’s family to let the wife go 
with her for a short while. Instead, the sisters went to the police and the wife never 
returned to the husband. Both the city court and the high court found him guilty of 
continuous violence towards her for 5 years. This was legally characterized as abuse, 
since he took advantage of her dependency on him. He was also convicted of regularly 
raping her, despite not explicitly using violence or threat of violence in every instance. 
The underlying threat of violence that existed in their relationship due to him earlier 
violently forcing her into vaginal, oral and anal sex was enough to make her feel forced 
to accept these acts later in their relationship, which were thus also characterized as rape. 
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The case involved testimonies from more than 10 witnesses, including family members 
and friends of both parties as well as a police officer. 
The Acquittal-case was decided in the City Court of Copenhagen on 11 October 2019. 
The defendant was accused of one instance of raping his wife in 2014 during a trip 
to Pakistan and of another instance in Denmark in 2016, in which he was accused 
of having thrown their 4-month-old child down on a bed, punched his wife several 
times in the face and finally raped her. Further, he was accused of another instance 
of violence against her in 2017 and of having attempted in 2019 to threaten her into 
not testifying against him. The result of the case was a full acquittal. Both parties 
were born in Pakistan and had independently travelled to Denmark around 2009 to 
pursue PhD studies and later careers. Before this, the woman had spent 2 years in 
Germany, while the man arrived directly to Denmark from Pakistan. They met each 
other in Denmark through their work, fell in love, and initiated a romantic and sexual 
relationship in 2011, without the knowledge of their families in Pakistan (who would 
not have approved). They moved in together in 2012. In 2013, they were married with 
the blessing of their families. As opposed to the Conviction-case, they were not isolated 
from the rest of society in Denmark. On the contrary, they rented a room in the home 
of a Danish family in 2012-2015 and shared both kitchen and bath with this family. 
Their child went to daycare, they both worked and the wife’s brother eventually moved 
to Denmark. In 2017, the husband applied for divorce. During the divorce proceedings, 
the parties had a bitter disagreement over the custody of their son. It was during these 
proceedings in 2018 that the wife first reported the accusations that led to the criminal 
proceedings. The wife originally won custody over their son but later contacted the 
husband and asked him to take over custody since she was about to get remarried and 
did not want the custody anymore. The criminal charges against the husband relied 
entirely on the wife’s testimony, while his defense relied on his testimony. There was no 
other testimonies in the case. 
Noticeable, the wife in the Acquittal-case was in a much stronger position in her 
marriage through higher education, deeper understanding of the society, legally being 
in Denmark etc., and her husband was in a similar position to herself, as opposed to 
the Conviction-case, where the husband was born in Denmark and had a strong family 
network. Similarly, the Conviction-case concerned a continuous abuse of the wife, while 
the Acquittal-case was focused on a few separate incidents. 
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Analysis 
Danish court case hearings can broadly be divided into four main steps. 1) Presentation 
of the facts of the case. 2) Parties and witnesses give testimonies and are questioned 
by lawyers. 3) Parties and their lawyers state their legal arguments. 4) The judges give 
their judgment and reasoning. Each step contains an important element for the final 
decision: Background information, testimonies and the legal reasoning of lawyers 
and judges. We have divided our analysis based on how culture was part of these four 
elements. 
1) Culture as relevant fact
In the judgment from the city court in the Conviction-case, which the high court later 
confirmed, the court directly mentioned that their decision was based on the fact that 
“The marriage was arranged by their parents and families. They only saw each other a 
few times before the marriage and without being alone together. [The wife’s sister] has 
explained about this that ‘After the decision had been made, [wife] was informed of it’.” 
It is interesting that out of all the information in the case, the court highlight this as a 
fact that their decision was based on. The case was not about whether any of the parties 
had been forced into the marriage. It concerned actions that took place 2-7 years after 
the marriage. However, the court must have found that the arranged marriage indirectly 
had an important effect as a background information to the case. 
The court mentioned this information together with the fact that the wife was illegally 
in Denmark. The context suggests that both elements were seen by the court as 
information explaining why she stayed with the husband for several years and did not 
go to the police earlier. 
To which extent the marriage was arranged had been an area of contention in the 
case and had led to different descriptions of the relevant culture. The sister of the wife 
claimed that the wife was not part of the decision to marry at all. She even claimed 
that the families had discussed whether the woman should marry the husband or 
his older brother, and only after deciding on this informed her of the decision. The 
husband disagreed with this description, especially in his testimony for the high court, 
and claimed to have met the woman in a clothing store in Pakistan and asked for her 
number. According to him, the couple themselves decided to get married and then 
their families gave their permission to the marriage. While he did agree that according 
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to their culture the marriage had to be agreed on between the families, he also stated 
that “nowadays Pakistani men and women choose themselves who they want to marry”. 
Since the court specifically quoted the sister’s statement in the decision, it appears that 
they trusted her descriptions of the culture and factual events. 
2) Culture in testimonies and as questioning tool
In the Acquittal-case, one of the lawyers tried to find out if the defendant could 
remember an incident that, according to the wife, took place on 1 January 2014 
during a trip to Pakistan. One of the lawyers in the case asked the defendant about his 
recollections of that day by using a cultural marker. He asked: “The incident is claimed 
to have happened on 1 January. That is a special day for Danes. Is it also a special day in 
Pakistan?” And when the defendant still did not recall the episode, the lawyer directly 
asked “Do you celebrate New Year’s in Pakistan”, to which the defendant replied “Yes, 
but not as much as in Denmark”. 
This is an interesting tool by the lawyer, which would have had more effect if the 
defendant celebrated New Year’s. Most Danes would easily be able to remember how 
they celebrated New Year’s, especially if they were travelling in another country during 
the holiday. Thus, the lawyer was using a celebration in his own cultural background to 
dig deeper into the defendant’s story. This highlights how important it is for lawyers to 
have an understanding of the culture of the parties. In this case, the defendant had no 
special recollection of the New Year’s celebration, maybe due to his cultural background. 
In other cases, the opposite could be true, with a date that seems mundane to the 
average Danish lawyer having importance in the parties’ culture and therefore being 
useful for establishing facts of a case or digging deeper into a testimony. 
In both court cases, culture was used frequently by the parties or witnesses to explain 
their actions and it was claimed several times that this or that was normal in Pakistani 
culture. The many references to what the parties and witnesses considered normal 
in their culture suggest that they found it necessary that the judges understood the 
cultural background before judging the case. Similarly, the lawyers also spend a great 
deal of their questions on asking about whether something was normal or not in the 
culture, suggesting that they also found that understanding the cultural background was 
important for reaching the right decision.
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3) Culture to frame the parties
The defendant in the Acquittal-case made it clear in his final statement that in his 
opinion, his former wife had been trying to portray him within a stereotypical view of 
Pakistani men and that “she is using religion and culture against me. We are both liberal 
and well-educated. We are not fundamentalists or conservative”. 
If true, his observation is in accordance with a previous study. This study found several 
Danish child custody cases in which one or both parties portrayed the other party as 
religious and conservative, while simultaneously portraying themselves as modern, 
secular and well-integrated in the Danish society (Schultz-Knudsen, 2019). The study 
suggests that Muslims in Denmark assume that Danish courts have a stereotypical 
view of Islam and see religiousness as a negative trait in custody cases and that Muslims 
therefore try to portray themselves as secular and the other party as religious. 
The same could likely be true in cases of marital rape. Since this was a criminal case, 
the court could and did decide that the burden of proof was on the prosecutor, and 
that while the woman might be telling the truth, her testimony alone was not enough 
to establish that a crime had been committed. This is a privilege that the courts do not 
have to the same extent in civil cases and custody cases. 
The courts should be aware of such tactics used by the parties and aim to not let 
stereotypical assumptions influence which party they believe, neither by assuming that 
stereotypes are correct, but also not by assuming that a stereotype is never true. In the 
Conviction-case, the court found similar claims to be true. 
4) Culture to determine the case
In the Conviction-case, one cultural element made it directly into the written reasoning 
of the city court, which was confirmed by the high court. The city court noted that it 
had “attributed significant weight to the fact that [the wife] saw no other option than 
to leave [the husband], despite knowing full well that it would be connected with great 
shame for both her family and [his] family and that she risked serious, maybe life-
threatening, retaliation from both families”. 
This was part of the court’s discussion on whether the husband’s or the wife’s story 
were to be trusted. Thus, the court had become convinced that for cultural reasons it 
was more difficult for the woman in this case to leave her husband than it would be for 
176 Naveiñ Reet: Nordic Journal of Law and Social Research (NNJLSR) No. 10 2020
most Danish women. Therefore, her actions had to be understood in a different light 
than similar actions from other Danish women. Since she left her husband despite these 
obstacles, the court found her story more trustworthy. 
In both cases, it was a problem for the prosecutor that the women reported the crimes 
4-5 years after the first incident that they considered rape. This would normally 
reduce the trustworthiness of their claims. In the Conviction-case, the court became 
convinced that the wife had been isolated and trapped and could reasonably claim to 
have made her accusations to the police as soon as she was able to flee her husband. In 
the Acquittal-case, the wife lived much more freely. Yet she continued her marriage, 
until her husband ended it in 2017, without telling anyone about the incidents that she 
considered rape until 2018. It was not discussed by the judges whether other cultural 
factors, such as a cultural taboo concerning sex and rape, might have made the women 
more hesitant to tell their stories.
Reflections
Culture can influence court cases in many ways, especially in cases regarding close 
relations, sexuality and marriage, such as custody cases and marital rape cases. Having 
an understanding of the parties’ culture can help the judges and lawyers ask the right 
questions and understand the statements of parties and witnesses in their right context. 
The cultural context can be directly relevant for evaluating which testimonies are most 
truthful or for understanding the motivations of actions. 
However, what the comparison of the two cases especially shows is that culture can vary 
markedly between people who “on paper” would seem to have the same background. In 
the Conviction-case, several witnesses and the defendant agreed that their community 
did not take lightly to divorced women, with the defendant acknowledging that his 
former wife could be expelled from her own family due to the divorce. Other witnesses 
stated that Pakistani women risk being killed, will find it very difficult to get remarried 
and that the wife’s own father and brothers disapproved of the divorce and wanted 
the families to negotiate a solution, despite the woman having been beaten by the 
husband. In the Acquittal-case, there was not nearly as much focus on the divorce being 
problematic, and both the man and the woman had remarried following the divorce. 
The Acquittal-case was also about a more modern and liberal couple which fell in love 
and began a sexual relationship before marriage, while the Conviction-case concerned 
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a more traditional and conservative family with arranged marriages, the wife staying at 
home and the couple living with his parents and siblings. 
Thus, it is important that the judges do not assume to know what e.g. Pakistani culture 
is, but listen to the actual cultural descriptions in the concrete case. 
Because culture can vary among people from the same ethnicity, it is also likely that 
parties and witnesses will disagree on which cultural rules were actually followed in the 
marriage. The courts have to be aware that parties and lawyers might attempt to rely 
on stereotypical cultural views to portray the other party in a more negative light, or to 
portray themselves positively. 
The cases also show that culture and religion do not necessarily follow each other. 
In the Conviction-case, the husband had a non-religious lifestyle, drank alcohol and 
had an affair. Simultaneously, he was found to be patriarchal and had forced his wife 
into submission. On the other hand, the wife and her sister were religious Muslims 
who refused to party, went to the mosque and taught others about religion, but they 
insisted on divorce even when their own father and brothers wanted to find a solution 
in accordance with their culture. Thus, it would be wrong of the courts to assume that a 
religious Muslim is necessarily culturally conservative or vice versa. 
In our impression, the Danish courts in these two cases handled these challenges well. 
In the Conviction-case, there was significant evidence to suggest that the woman was 
telling the truth about the marriage. In the Acquittal-case, the only evidence against the 
husband was the testimony of the wife, and her description of him being a conservative 
and patriarchal man did not seem to correspond with objective facts in the case. 
It is possible that culture can play a role in other ways in rape cases. In the Acquittal-
case, the defendant was also accused of having tried to pressure his former wife into not 
testifying against him by threatening to tell her new fiancé and her new friends that 
the defendant and her had lived together before getting married. Such a statement has 
very different implications depending on whether the culture of the woman’s family is 
accepting of premarital relations or not, but in this case it was not directly related to the 
rape accusations. 
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Conclusions
This article shows how comparing Danish law with Muslim and Pakistani law can lead 
to powerful insights about both systems. Danish comparative law most often compares 
Danish legislation with legislation in neighboring countries or other similar countries, 
but comparing to a legal system developed in a more different culture and society is 
valuable too. As we have seen by comparing with the legislation in Pakistan, in both 
countries the socio-economic changes are challenging older views on women and rape, 
while the legal system tries to maintain as much continuity in the rape definition as 
possible. Thus, despite Pakistan in many ways being a much more conservative country 
than Denmark, the legal definition of rape uses the term “consent” simply because they 
have held on to the definitions used in their legal history, but their courts have similarly 
held on to old views on what constitutes consent. 
The cases we have analyzed also give insights for current legal debates. In this article, we 
saw a Danish law professor argue that a man pressuring his wife into having sex twice 
a week by threatening to divorce her should not be criminalized, because she still had 
the choice. This seems to be a westernized and liberal view of free choice. In one of our 
cases, both the husband, wife and witnesses agreed that a divorce had harsh cultural 
implications for the woman, could lead to her own family killing her and could cause 
her deportation from Denmark. Feminist voices in Pakistan have argued that in such 
cases, it should be criminalized if a husband takes advantage of her vulnerable position 
and pressures her into fulfilling his sexual demands. This shows that areas of consent 
are grayed out in marriage and that even a legislation based on consent will have to 
further consider how to treat consent achieved under some form of pressure. It is our 
impression that the recent debates in Denmark have not really considered how consent 
and threats can have very different implications in minority cultures. 
Concepts and definitions of rape are changing. In both societies in our analysis, 
cultural views on women have influenced what the population and legal scholars have 
considered to be rape. If a new legislation is more progressive than existing cultural 
views, it will be important for the society to educate the population on these new 
understandings of what constitutes rape and marital rape. This goes for both the 
majority and minority populations. 
As we have shown in this article, many cultural themes are involved in rape cases at 
Danish courts, especially cases on marital rape. When making a judgment, the judges 
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have to be aware of 1) the legal culture, 2) their own personal culture and 3) the culture 
of the parties.  
1) The judge needs to be aware of the cultural view on rape that the court itself is 
supposed to represent. This is the standard job of judges, who have to understand 
what the legislation wants them to do. In Denmark, this meant that regardless of the 
judges’ own views on rape, the legal culture that they represented until 1 January 2021 
did not automatically consider it a crime for a man to have sex with his wife without 
her consent. Instead, the action generally had to have involved an element of violence, 
threat of violence or similar. We have seen from the Criminal Law Council’s report that 
even a girlfriend resisting and pushing her boyfriend away was not considered raped if 
she eventually gave in to avoid trouble or arguments. However, the case we analyzed 
which led to conviction showed that when the husband had previously violently raped 
his wife, the court could extend the verdict of rape to not only those instances where 
the husband violently forced his wife into intercourse, but also to sex which the wife 
engaged in because she knew that the husband could get violent. 
2) While the culture of the legal system is important, the judge’s or juror’s own personal 
culture also plays a role. We have seen this in the legal history of Denmark, where the 
legislation had to be changed because the jurors were not applying the actual legal 
provisions to rape in existing relationships. We saw a similar trend in Pakistan, where 
the judges of the lower courts punished women for being pregnant outside of marriage 
or for having “admitted” to intercourse by reporting a rape, despite the highest court in 
Pakistan insisting that women were not to be held responsible in these situations. Thus, 
it is important for judges to make sure that they are not unduly influenced by their own 
cultural views. By reflecting on and being aware of their own cultural bias, they will 
better be able to avoid it influencing their decisions. This is however a difficult balance, 
since one of the reasons that the Danish court system use jurors in criminal law cases 
is directly to make sure that decisions are in accordance with the population’s view on 
justice and crime (Melchior, 2009). While this is supposed to protect the general feeling 
of justice in the society, the examples in this article show that the weaker party – often 
the woman – risks having her legal rights undermined if the dominant cultural view is 
e.g. holding on to older patriarchal ideas. More research into the right balance between 
these opposing, but both valid, interests is needed. 
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3) The analysis of our two court cases have further shown how the culture of the two 
parties also influences the court case and judgment in various ways. For the lawyers and 
judges, it can be necessary to get a deep understanding of the culture to ask the right 
questions during the testimonies, to get all relevant facts into the case and to understand 
the parties’ motivations. Thus, every case is different. The same actions might have to 
be understood and treated differently based on the cultural background. It should be 
noted that in 2009, Danish legislators explicitly prohibited judges from considering it as 
a mitigating circumstance in the sentencing that a crime was committed due to religious 
or cultural reasons (law no 330, which created the current art. 80, 3 in the Criminal 
Law Code). However, culture can still play a role in these cases. As our example with the 
threat to expose a premarital relation shows, culture can be the opposite of a mitigating 
circumstance, and be the very reason that something has to be considered a crime.
Importantly, culture is not uniform and is often contested in these cases. Not everyone 
from Pakistan has the same culture, and it can be an advantage for the victim and 
perpetrator of marital rape to present different descriptions of the cultural rules followed 
within their marriage. In these cases, the judges cannot just look at what is the norm for 
other people of the same ethnicity or nationality, but will have to assess which testimony 
is the most trustworthy given the context. The judge should especially be aware that 
parties might use cultural stereotypes to portray each other negatively, which should 
not be allowed to influence the decision unduly. The same goes for assumptions about 
religion and culture. As we have shown in one of the cases, being a deeply religious 
Muslim does not mean being culturally conservative, and being culturally conservative 
does not mean being religious. The courts must make sure to separate such terms. 
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